STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

STRUCTURING THE TOTAL ARMY FOR FULL-SPECTRUM READINESS

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ABSTRACT

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The United States Army is in the final stages of a massive post-Cold War draw-down of force structure, end-strength, and budget. Without the imminent threat of global war, the National Security Strategy has evolved to call for the heightened application of national power to engage an increasingly dynamic and uncertain world. The resulting frequent commitment of Army forces to smaller-scale contingencies is reducing its readiness and stretching its capabilities to respond to the strategy's most challenging requirement, fighting and winning two overlapping major theater wars. This paper examines the roots of the Army's readiness dilemma and explores potential approaches to restore the Army's readiness to execute the full spectrum of missions. Finally, the paper frames a recommendation for organizational changes, suggesting that the Total Army's force structure be shaped and sized to more effectively and efficiently provide ready and responsive forces for both major theater war and smaller-scale contingency requirements.

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STRUCTURING THE TOTAL ARMY FOR FULL-SPECTRUM READINESS

> If we do not do something, we run the risk of a return to the hollow Army and a risk of not being able to execute our national strategy.[1]
>
> — GEN Dennis J. Reimer

INTRODUCTION: "HIGH RISK"

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States Army has confronted escalating readiness challenges. Risk of not being able to execute the national strategy is increasing as a result of a fundamentally changed global security environment, a significantly smaller Army and budget, increased operational commitments, and competing modernization requirements.

With the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the United States stands alone as a world superpower. As the world emerges from the bi-polar certainty and stability of the Cold War, the U.S. has become the indispensable nation for peace, stability, and security operations. However, without the imminent threat of global war, and without a clear understanding of what the post-Cold War requirements would demand of its military, the U.S. government quickly collected its "peace dividend" by significantly cutting military end-strength and force structure, and slashing defense spending.

Even as the military became smaller, the U.S. adopted a national security strategy based on "the imperative of engagement" in order to exert American leadership in an

increasingly dynamic and uncertain world.[2] This strategy has challenged the U.S. military to respond with unexpected frequency to a wide range of threats to U.S. interests that have emerged. As a result, the smaller Army is busier than ever, shaping the global environment and responding to crises. The heavy commitment to non-combat operations has stressed the Army's ability to remain trained and ready for war.

Although current war-fighting readiness remains the Army's top priority, under-funded modernization requirements are in growing competition for limited budget dollars. With information technology offering a possible revolution in military affairs, and unexpected contingencies and near-term readiness requiring immediate funds, the Army has squeezed money from efficiencies and made tough budget decisions in order to try to invest in its future. Though modernization funding is still well below desired levels, leaders are trying to walk the fine line between acceptable near-term and long-term readiness risk.

Thus, with diminishing resources and expanding requirements, near-term readiness risk is a growing issue. The readiness issue reached a head on September 29, 1998, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee to acknowledge declining readiness levels and to seek additional resources to mitigate the readiness risk to executing the national strategy. The Chiefs described the degree of risk in stark strategic terms, stating that although the military was

still ready to carry out the national strategy, "the United States now faces moderate risk of increased casualties and prolonged conflict if it gets involved in one war, and high risk if it becomes involved in a second war."[3]

At its core, the Army's readiness challenge stems from a mismatch between mission requirements and forces. Senior Army leaders have resisted reorganizing the Army's force structure to more effectively and efficiently focus unit capabilities and training on the full-spectrum of missions. They point out that the military's primary purpose is to fight the nation's wars, and argue that the force structure should not be sub-optimized for lesser missions. Nevertheless, the national strategy should drive the size and shape of the force structure. Is the Army's readiness ultimately helped or hurt by the current structure?

This paper examines the roots of the Army's readiness dilemma by analyzing the primary factors that led to the current situation. The paper then explores potential approaches to restoring readiness. Finally, the paper frames a recommendation for organizational changes, suggesting that the Total Army's force structure be shaped and sized to more effectively and efficiently provide ready and responsive forces to both major theater war (MTW) and smaller-scale contingency (SSC) requirements.

THE ARMY'S READINESS DILEMMA

The increased readiness risk for the Army is the cumulative result of many factors, including a strategy that overreaches the military's current capabilities, increased deployments with less forces and a smaller budget, and the competing budget requirements for modernization.

The Army's readiness challenges have grown since the end of the Cold War as the National Security Strategy (NSS) has evolved to place greater emphasis on engagement missions. In the wake of the Cold War, major theater warfare has supplanted global war as the biggest national security concern. As such, it is the most significant military requirement in the NSS and has driven the current force structure to resemble a cut-down version of the Cold War army. Currently, the NSS states that "for the foreseeable future, the United States, in concert with regional allies, must remain able to deter credibly and defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames."[4] However, the two-MTW requirement is folded into the broader imperative of global engagement.[5]

The National Military Strategy (NMS) describes an integrated approach that increases emphasis on the more relevant post-Cold War engagement requirements. This approach obligates the military to manage the competing requirements to *shape* the international environment to deter or prevent threats, to *respond* to the full spectrum of potential crises, and to *prepare now* for

an uncertain future.[6] This strategy has evolved from practice as the United States explores the requirements of its role as the remaining superpower and increases its commitment to shaping and smaller-scale responding opportunities.

General Colin Powell published the first post-Cold War national military strategy in 1992. This strategy called for a "Base Force" capable of responding rapidly to defeat a regional aggressor. He also recognized that when the U.S. responded to one major regional crisis, it must maintain enough forces so that the U.S. and its allies would not be vulnerable to potential aggression elsewhere.[7] Though the Base Force strategy did not explicitly call for a two-MTW strategy, it did recognize the vulnerability of a committed U.S. force to opportunism from a second potential threat. To accomplish its post-Cold War military objectives, the Base Force strategy resourced the Army with twelve active divisions, six reserve divisions, and two cadre divisions.[8]

The following year, the Bottom-Up Review (BUR) refined the Base Force strategy, formally establishing the two nearly-simultaneous MTW strategy that we have today. The BUR acknowledged that the Base Force was sized to allow us to fight two MTWs plus conduct some other concurrent operations. Nevertheless, it recommended that the military's force structure be reduced to ten active divisions and five-plus reserve divisions in order to achieve the expected post-Cold War "peace

dividend." Additionally, the BUR called for fifteen Army National Guard (ARNG) brigades to be enhanced to improve their readiness and offset the risk of the reduced number of active divisions in a two-MTW scenario.[9] The BUR acknowledged that while this strategy allowed "us to carry forward with confidence our strategy of being able to fight and win two major regional conflicts nearly simultaneously…it leaves little other active force structure to provide other overseas presence or to conduct peacekeeping or other lower-intensity operations if we had to fight two MRCs [major regional contingencies] at once."[10] Thus, the BUR knowingly created an ends-means mismatch in the strategy by requiring the Army to conduct engagement missions with forces required for the two-MTW mission.

In 1997, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) reaffirmed the two-MTW strategy, and further emphasized that we must be able to transition to fighting MTWs from a posture of global engagement.[11] The QDR acknowledges that withdrawing forces from SSC operations, reconstituting, retraining, and then deploying to an MTW in accordance with required timelines "may pose significant operational, diplomatic, and political challenges." However, with no apparent alternatives identified in the strategy, the QDR simply dismissed these challenges by insisting that "the ability to transition between peacetime operations and warfighting remains a fundamental requirement for virtually every unit in the U.S. military." Calling the transition of forces from SSC

operations—where little or no relevant combat training is likely—to an MTW a "challenge" is an understatement of the highest magnitude. At best, this strategy is wishful thinking; at worst, it is creating the conditions for a future high-casualty disaster.

The QDR reaffirmed the BUR's allocation to the Army of ten active divisions and fifteen reserve enhanced separate brigades (eSBs). The eSBs are specifically tasked to "provide an important hedge against adverse circumstances—such as the use of weapons of mass destruction—in major theater wars by augmenting or reinforcing active combat units."[12] Left without a major role in the QDR were the ARNG's eight divisions. The QDR pointed out that these divisions are not included in existing MTW war plans, and called into question their continued relevance.[13] So, while the current strategy appears to place too many mission requirements on too few forces, there does appear to be additional uncommitted force structure available.

Since the end of the Cold War, the Army's senior leaders have sized, shaped, and justified the Total Army to fight two MTWs. They structured the active force to provide the Army's primary combat forces. At the same time, they organized the Army's reserve forces, the Army Reserve and National Guard, to provide critical individuals and units to augment and reinforce active forces in time of war or national emergency. To conduct the secondary shape and respond missions, senior leaders have

drawn units from the MTW forces under the assumption that they could be quickly extracted from an SSC if necessary.

A force structured for two-MTWs seemed more reasonable immediately after the Cold War, when the military was searching for reasons to retain force structure and SSCs were historically the exception and not the rule. However, since the end of the Cold War, the frequency of deployments for SSCs has grown greatly. The U.S. responded to a total of just sixteen contingencies during the entire Cold War period (1947-1989). Then, from just 1989 to 1997, the U.S. responded to a burdensome forty-five contingencies.[14] In 1997, an average of more than 31,000 soldiers were deployed every day to seventy different countries around the world.[15] Since the substantial Army forces that are globally engaged will generally not be immediately ready to respond to an MTW, the NSS has implicitly accepted the risk of this loss of responsive combat power.

Currently, Army forces are committed to numerous missions that decrease their readiness and responsiveness to fight an MTW. Significant forces are conducting or supporting a host of SSC missions in places like the Balkans, Kuwait, Haiti, and the Sinai. Commitments of major Army units include the 1st Cavalry Division in Bosnia, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment as it recovers from Bosnia and prepares for transition to the experimental Strike Force, and the 10th Mountain Division as it prepares for deployment to Bosnia. Between Partnership for Peace training

requirements and support for Bosnia and other missions in Europe and Africa, much of the forces forward deployed to Europe find little time to focus on war-fighting. Additionally, the 4th Infantry Division is unavailable as it transitions to the Army's first digitized division.

Perhaps the truest measure of falling readiness, short of wartime performance, is the performance of combat units at the combat training centers. Recently, the Army's Inspector General (IG) confirmed for senior leaders that "entry-level performance at the combat training centers 'continues to decline,' in part because units have fewer opportunities to train at home station."[16] The IG's report goes on to cite factors that inhibit unit training, to include lack of resources, absent or distracted leaders, unsynchronized modernization, the high pace of operations, personnel turbulence, a poor understanding of training doctrine, and defused mission focus.[17]

The significant increase in unit deployments to SSCs has caused unit training readiness to suffer from a lack of mission focus throughout the Army. The NSS states that "appropriate U.S. forces will be kept at a high level of readiness and will be trained, equipped and organized to be multi-mission capable."[18] But U.S. Army training doctrine recognizes that units do not have the resources to be prepared for all missions; therefore, it calls for unit training to be focused on essential tasks derived from missions. Although the Army focuses its peacetime training

on its primary war-fighting mission, frequent deployments to non-combat operations diverts the attention of an increasingly large share of the force. Most active divisions have experienced one or more major deployments to conduct SSC missions in the past decade. At any given time, many units are either in the preparation, deployment, or post-deployment training cycle, or supporting a unit that is. However, most units focus their normal peacetime training on MTW tasks. This leads to the inefficient cycling of unit training, shifting from a focus on war-fighting tasks, to SSC tasks for a deployment, and back to war-fighting tasks after redeployment.

The decrease in the Army's readiness has also resulted from other post-Cold War realities. Not only has the Army had to deal with the dramatic increase in the frequency of deployments, but it has done so with a substantially smaller force. From 1989 to 1997, the Army reduced it ranks by over 630,000 soldiers and civilians, and cut its combat divisions from eighteen active and ten reserve divisions to ten active and eight reserve divisions.[19]

The Army's disproportionate decrease in buying power, especially with the increase in deployments since the Cold War, is certainly a significant factor in today's readiness difficulties. Since the Cold War ended, the Army's budget has decreased almost 39 percent—compared to 29 percent for non-Army DoD buying power—with an annual budget falling from $102 billion in FY 89 to $64 billion in FY99.[20] While the Army has provided the

preponderance of force—more than 60 percent of the forces—in 28 of the 32 significant operations since the end of the Cold War, the Army's share of the DoD budget has dropped from 27 percent in FY89 to 24.9 percent in FY99.[21]

Though Congress is now partially addressing funding for current readiness, funding for modernization has remained substantially below levels required to maintain ready forces in the future. In its FY 99 posture statement, the Army describes the tough budget tradeoffs it has been forced to make and the need to restore support for future readiness.

> During the post-Cold War drawdown, the Army made the decision to mortgage future readiness in order to maintain current readiness and soldier programs and to meet increased operational demands. That strategy is becoming increasingly untenable. Maintaining America's technological edge is dependent on taking full advantage of Information Age technologies available today. To maintain our current overmatch against potential enemies and fulfill Joint Vision 2010's requirements of full spectrum dominance, Army future readiness must now receive greater support.[22]

The National Defense Panel (NDP) came to the same conclusion, recommending that the Army accept more near-term risk to put greater priority of resources on the future in order to mitigate risk to long-term security. The NDP's assessment is that current posture minimizes near-term risk at a time when danger is moderate to low, with too many resources used to support the strategy instead of long-term security.[23]

Though Presidential and Congressional support for a modest increase in resources over the next five years looks promising,

returning to a level of acceptable risk will require the Army to do more than garner its share of a slightly increased defense budget.[24] Whatever additional resources Congress may decide to give the Army will only fix part of the problem. Certainly more resources will improve the funding of current readiness training, base operations requirements, quality of life programs, and modernization accounts. But what about the negative readiness impact on the Army of frequent deployments to SSCs? Even with more money, the Army still faces a significant, long-term readiness challenge.

The Army is not likely to regain any of its lost force structure, and an increase in the budget, by itself, will not address the destructive mismatch between mission requirements and forces available. It is time for the Army to apply internal solutions to reduce risk in both current and long-term readiness.

There is perhaps no clearer signal that the Army has readiness problems that additional money will not solve than the fact that it was recently compelled to deploy one of its first-to-fight divisions, the 1st Cavalry Division, to Bosnia to conduct peacekeeping operations. With these combat forces focused on peacekeeping tasks for more than a year (including train-up, deployment, peacekeeping, and redeployment time) how ready is the division to deploy to a possible MTW? In 1997, the QDR stated that "employing any of the Force Package I divisions for peacetime engagement or smaller-scale contingencies would

further increase the delay in meeting major theater war timelines, and could put the halt phase at risk."[25]

APPROACHES TO RESTORE READINESS

So, how should the Army solve its mismatch between mission requirements and forces available? Some possible approaches to address this problem include a change in the two-MTW strategy, a reduced commitment of the military for engagement missions, increased use of the Reserve Component (RC) to meet mission requirements, and a restructuring of the Army's forces. The Army has discussed or implemented to some degree each of these courses of action. A quick look at the potential of each alternative will reveal their promise for addressing both the near and long-term risk of an Army teetering on the edge of a readiness crisis.

If the Army does not have the forces necessary to execute the mission requirements of the national strategy, then what about changing the strategy? Does the Army really need to be ready to fight two MTWs nearly simultaneously? The two-MTW strategy remains a prudent strategy given U.S. responsibilities as the remaining global superpower and the capabilities of rogue nations to take advantage of a U.S. force that is fully committed to a first MTW. The NSS describes the reasoning behind this policy decision, saying that it "deters opportunism elsewhere while we are heavily committed to deterring or defeating aggression in one theater… It also provides a hedge against the possibility that we might encounter threats larger or more

difficult than we expected."[26] The NMS points out that "the ability to rapidly defeat initial enemy advances short of their objectives in two theaters in close succession reassures our allies and ensures the protection of our worldwide interests."[27] The QDR endorsed the two-MTW strategy, as "imperative…now and for the foreseeable future," stating that the U.S., "as a global power with worldwide interests," needs to have the capability to "deter aggression, prevent coercion of allied or friendly governments, and defeat aggression should it occur."[28] Although the NDP concluded that the two-MTW construct was "a force-sizing function and not a strategy," they acknowledged that "to some degree, it remains a useful mechanism today."[29]

If the two-MTW requirements of the strategy are valid, then what about decreasing the frequency of engagement missions around the world? After all, the unexpectedly high frequency of SSCs since the end of the Cold War has decreased the readiness of forces that were primarily structured for MTWs. Commitment to SSCs not only entangles forces that are critical to success in an MTW, it also requires significant retraining for most forces before they will be ready for deployment to an MTW. Currently, the Army plans on six months retraining as a rule of thumb following a six to twelve month SSC deployment.[30] However, the NSS correctly rejects the alternative of isolationism and asserts that "we must…continue to exert global leadership and remain the preferred security partner for the community of states that share

our interests."[31] The QDR used recent experience and intelligence projections to predict that:

> ...the demand for smaller-scale contingency operations is expected to remain high over the next 15 to 20 years...these operations will still likely pose the most frequent challenge for U.S. force through 2015 and may require significant commitments of forces, both active and Reserve. Over time, substantial commitments to multiple concurrent smaller-scale contingency operations will certainly stress U.S. forces in ways that must be carefully managed.[32]

Along with the increased number of SSCs since the end of the Cold War, the Army has significantly increased its use of RC forces to conduct current missions and relieve active force deployment tempo. For example, in 1997, an average of about 25 percent of the Army's forces in Bosnia were from the RC.[33] Due to the Army's integrated force structure, a result of the Defense Department's Total Force Policy, the RC provides unique and essential capabilities to any force deployment package. Additionally, a smaller active force has led the Army to rely on reserve forces to pick up some of the increased mission load, thus, relieving active force deployment tempo. Furthermore, deployment of citizen-soldiers is necessary to invoke the nation's will for all major contingencies, not just major wars. However, without careful management of the RC, the Army could break this force.

As a result of frequent and recurring deployments of reserve soldiers, cracks in the RC have begun to show. Lengthy deployments are straining employer support for the reserve

program, especially in small towns and small businesses.[34] Frequent deployments of the same individuals or units is perhaps the most significant factor in producing the tension between reservists and their employers, not to mention their families. The increased deployment demands also tax the RC's training model. Thirty-nine days of training per year may not be enough to meet the increasing readiness demands on a force that is frequently turned to for quick-response SSC missions. The Army needs a healthy RC to be trained and ready in time of war or national emergency. The Army must develop a long-term strategy that capitalizes on the inherent strengths of the RC in a way that meets the intent of the Total Force Policy without bankrupting the reserve system for the future.

While the active Army erodes the war-fighting readiness of its combat forces on shape and respond missions, the combat brigades and divisions of the ARNG remain largely on the shelf. General Reimer's white paper on Total Army integration offered that there are more than sufficient missions to justify the size of the Total Army.[35] However, as pointed out earlier, only the eSBs have been assigned combat missions in current war plans.[36] The eight ARNG divisions were assigned "instead to missions which include easing Army personnel tempo in peacetime operations, providing rotation forces for extended contingencies, responding to domestic emergencies, and hedging against the emergence of a more threatening international environment."[37] To better use some

of these forces, the Army recently decided to convert twelve ARNG combat brigades "to provide needed combat support and service support requirements identified as essential to the National Military Strategy."[38] Still, the Army possesses a tremendous additional potential capability in its reserve combat forces that should be used to decrease the current readiness risk.

ORGANIZING FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

How can the Army improve its readiness to fight and win two MTWs at the same time that it improves its capabilities and readiness to respond to the host of SSCs? A larger budget can provide only temporary and incomplete relief to the Army's readiness challenges. It cannot cure the debilitating mismatch between mission requirements and forces. The remedy for this mismatch will require major surgery on the force structure of the Total Army.

The mission requirements-forces mismatch is not a result of the inadequate size of the current force, but a result of the inappropriate shape of the force inherited from the Cold War strategy. Within the Total Army, enough forces exist to meet all of the mission requirements. The Army's leadership must articulate a more concrete vision for Total Army integration that will organize its force structure for successful execution of the national security strategy. This vision must describe a future Total Army force structure with unit-specific MTW or SSC mission focus and organization. Essentially, the Total Army must reshape

its forces to more effectively and efficiently meet the full-spectrum of requirements, thereby reducing the impact of SSC missions on the Army's readiness to conduct MTWs.

The Army's most serious readiness shortfall is that it is not organized to provide sufficient forces ready to conduct two MTWs from a posture of global engagement. According to the BUR, an active force of at least twelve divisions and eight reserve enhanced equivalent divisions are needed to win two nearly-simultaneous MTWs plus conduct some SSCs.[39] Desert Storm required a U.S. force of seven divisions, five of which were armored or mechanized. Today, the Army has only ten active divisions, including six heavy divisions, and three of the heavy divisions are currently committed or unavailable for rapid response to an MTW. Simple math shows that the Army's two-MTW strategy is bankrupt and in need of a more realistic balancing of the ends, ways, and means necessary for success. Furthermore, with one of the Army's most modernized and ready heavy divisions currently deployed to Bosnia for a peacekeeping mission that has little need for heavy forces, it is clear that the shape of the Army's force structure must be addressed. With significant portions of the active Army committed to various missions, the Army is accepting unreasonable risk expecting these units to withdraw, reconstitute, train, and deploy to an MTW.

Although the RC is busier than ever, reinforcing and augmenting active forces all over the world, its combat units

have been largely untapped. Currently, the fifteen eSBs are available and have the mission to augment and reinforce active combat units as a hedge against adverse circumstances.[40] However, the eSBs will generally require at least 90-days to mobilize, train and deploy to an MTW, and the GAO judged that capability to be "highly uncertain."[41] Although the ARNG's eight divisions have no mission in current war plans, the successful rotation of some of the 29th Infantry Division's subordinate units to Bosnia in 1997-98, and the projected deployment of the 49th Armored Division headquarters to Bosnia in 2000, demonstrate the potential of the reserve divisions to contribute to the Army's capabilities to conduct SSCs over extended periods. However, such limited use of reserve forces does not begin to tap the RC's potential to provide "rotation forces for extended contingencies," as described in the QDR.[42] With the right mission focus, force structure, and readiness enablers, much more of the RC's combat force structure could contribute greatly to restoring Total Army readiness for the full range of missions.

It is time for the Army to adopt a Total Army strategy that does more than integrate the active and reserve components on the fringe. The Army should restructure its forces and reallocate its missions to more effectively and efficiently use its total force to execute the two-MTW strategy.

The Army's approach should be guided by the principle that the active component (AC) should be sized and structured to do

those missions that cannot be done by the reserve components. Generally, the AC brings to the table forces that are maintained at the highest levels of readiness; therefore, they are responsive to missions that require rapidly deployable forces. Likewise, the RC should generally be sized and shaped to provide the forces that are needed later in a contingency, such as augmenting and reinforcing forces, or rotation forces for extended contingencies.

Accordingly, for the Army's two-MTW requirements, the primary combat forces needed for the first MTW and the halt phase of the second MTW should be active component forces. However, the combat forces required for the decisive counterattack phase of the second MTW should be primarily drawn from the ARNG.

The objective of the halt phase is "to halt the enemy invasion in forward areas and protect key assets and terrain features."[43] The Army's mission during this phase is "to establish blocking positions on key axes of advance while conducting a mobile defense in depth."[44] Key to preventing an MTW from becoming a prolonged and difficult war is the success of the halt phase fighting.[45] There is no doubt that the halt phase force for the first MTW must be ready to deploy immediately; therefore, it must be drawn from active forces maintained at the highest levels of readiness. The second MTW will also require active forces, for even as the first MTW forces deploy, a second halt phase force

must be ready in order to deter an opportunistic rogue state from being tempted to initiate a second MTW.

Phases II and III of an MTW call for the build-up of large combat forces and the subsequent "decisive counterattack aimed at destroying enemy forces, restoring borders, and achieving key political goals."[46] Through improved prepositioned material, airlift, sealift, and deployment infrastructure, the Army is working toward a capability to deploy a seven-division MTW force in 75-days.[47] Again, for the first MTW, this timeline requires active combat forces in order to complete the deployment with combat-ready forces. If necessary, later deploying eSBs could be ready to augment this force. If reserve combat forces are ready for deployment by C+90 of the first MTW, a goal towards which the fifteen eSBs are currently working, then these forces would be ready to deploy as reinforcing forces to a second MTW following the deployment of the active component halt phase force. To make this a realistic strategy, the Army must identify, structure, and train the reserve brigades or divisions for this specific mission. Additionally, it is imperative that the national strategy require these forces to be called-up for mobilization no later than C-day of the first MTW in order to begin their post-mobilization training in preparation for a possible second MTW.

Realists will recognize that the weakness of this concept is the current readiness of the reserve combat units. Even if the eSBs can achieve their aim of being ready for deployment by C+90,

under current doctrine the Army needs to build its counterattack force around divisions. Without a fundamental change in the way reserve combat divisions are organized and trained, there is no hope of preparing them for combat within required deployment timelines.

The answer to this dilemma may be found by integrating active-duty officers and NCOs directly into key positions in reserve brigades and divisions and significantly increasing the number of full-time support reserve personnel within the reserve units. This concept has been used effectively by the Marine Forces Reserve to provide units of generally battalion strength or less to augment or reinforce their active divisions.[48] The Marine Corps integrates a combination of active reservists and active Marines into its Selected Marine Corps Reserve units at a ratio of about 20 percent to achieve deployment readiness by C+30.[49] During the Persian Gulf War, Marine combat battalions achieved credible results, although most observers recommended increasing post-mobilization training time.[50]

The Army appears to be moving in the same direction as the Marine Corps with its plans to stand-up two AC/RC integrated divisions with the concept that two active Army headquarters be given responsibility for the combat readiness of three eSBs each.[51] Although these divisions are not currently structured to be deployable as divisions, they could be further expanded to full, multi-component divisions in the future.

The increased use of active and reserve observer-controller-trainers, organized into Training Support Brigades to help train high priority reserve units, is also a step in the direction of increased use of active forces to improve reserve force readiness. A further evolution of this concept would assign these leaders to key or shadow positions in the RC units, in the same way the Marine Corps integrates its AC instructor-inspectors. Besides the direct benefit of improved readiness, the large-scale infusion of AC officers and non-commissioned officers into the RC would also improve understanding and trust between the AC and RC. Although the AC force structure costs would be high, the benefit of this structure would be a more relevant and ready Total Army.[52]

In sum, the active Army should identify its halt phase forces for both MTWs—at least one heavy division each—and resource and train them to the readiness levels required for that specific mission. The Army should also identify the build-up/decisive counterattack forces required for both MTWs, and, likewise, resource and train them to the required readiness levels for this specific mission. This force will likely require four to six additional divisions for each MTW, assuming that a total of five to seven divisions will be required to win an MTW.[53] For the second MTW, the Army must organize and train four to six AC/RC integrated divisions to reinforce the AC halt phase force and to conduct the decisive counterattack. The forces needed for these AC/RC integrated divisions must be drawn from active force

structure not required for MTW or SSC missions and the existing ARNG eSBs and combat divisions.

Thus, a total of approximately six to eight active divisions and four to six reserve divisions would be needed for the two-MTW requirements of the strategy. These forces should generally not train for, nor be deployed to, non-combat SSCs that would erode their readiness for their primary MTW mission.

Key to preserving the readiness of the MTW forces is a separate force, an SSC Corps, that is organized and trained to conduct the non-combat SSC missions. Again, the AC should be sized and structured to do those missions that require trained and ready, rapidly deployable forces. Likewise, the RC should be sized and shaped to provide the forces that are needed later in a contingency, such as augmenting and reinforcing forces, or rotation forces for extended contingencies. In both cases, these units should be modular in design in order to facilitate rapid tailoring into force packages for the variety of SSCs that are possible. Divisions may not be a flexible enough organization for this mission. Instead, perhaps command and control headquarters should be organized and trained for the combined and joint operations that characterize SSCs. Sub-units could then be attached to provide required capabilities for specific missions.

SSCs are more likely to require extended commitments of units. Therefore, use of reserve forces to rotate in after the first six to twelve months of a contingency is important to the

success of this concept. In most cases, active forces should provide the initial deployment force, after which time they should train for the next possible contingency in order to preserve the Army's continuous capability to rapidly deploy an SSC response force. With six to twelve months of lead time, reserve rotational units will have sufficient time to mobilize and prepare for a mission. Building a total force that commits the National Command Authority to the use of RC units for extended deployments will also ensure that such commitments are made with the full support of Congress and the American people.

Both active and reserve forces that are a part of this "SSC Corps" must be structured to provide the kind of forces needed for SSCs and adequate recovery time between missions. SSC force structure should be shaped to more adequately conduct the most likely SSC missions (e.g., military police, civil affairs, light or medium infantry). Active forces should have sufficient redundancy of forces to allow at least six to twelve months at home station between deployments. Additionally, soldiers and leaders must be able to rotate to the MTW units regularly to avoid retention problems due to deployment burnout. Likewise, reserve forces should be structured with sufficient redundancy to allow enough time between missions, perhaps three to five years, to mitigate any adverse impacts such as strained employer support, and recruiting and retention problems.

CONCLUSION

With mission-focused structure, resourcing, and training, the readiness of the total force will improve. With a more Total Army approach, the Army can implement the NDP's recommendation for placing greater priority on long-term readiness during a period of decreased risk, while reducing the risk to fighting and winning two nearly-simultaneous MTWs from a posture of global engagement. The result will be a more relevant and ready Total Army force structure for the world as it is today, allowing the Army to place increased emphasis on preparing now for the uncertain world of tomorrow.

WORD COUNT = 5,989

ENDNOTES

[1] Rick Maze, "Congress Hears Readiness Woes: Chiefs: Restore Value of Retirement, Close Pay Gap," Army Times, 12 October 1998, p. 4.

[2] The White House, A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1998), 1.

[3] Maze, 4.

[4] White House, 12.

[5] White House, 1-3.

[6] John M. Shalikashvili, Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a New Era (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997), 15-16.

[7] Colin L. Powell, The National Military Strategy 1992 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), 7.

[8] Ibid., 19.

[9] Les Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1993), 7-8.

[10] Ibid., 28-30.

[11] William S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1997), 11-12.

[12] Ibid., 32.

[13] Ibid., 32-33.

[14] Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1998 Strategic Assessment: Engaging Power for Peace (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998), 156.

[15] Robert M. Walker and Dennis J. Reimer, A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army Fiscal Year 1999 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1998), 10.

[16] Sean D. Naylor, "Army IG Confirms Combat Training Woes," Army Times, 15 February 1999, p. 20.

[17] Naylor, 20.

[18] White House, 21.

[19] Walker and Reimer, 4.

[20] Ibid., 67.

[21] Ibid., 3.

[22] Walker and Reimer, 51.

[23] Report of the National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1997), 23-24.

[24] Rick Maze, "Lawmakers Compete to Increase Pay and Benefits," Army Times, 1 February 1999, p. 18.

[25] Cohen, 36.

[26] White House, 22.

[27] Shalikashvili, 3.

[28] Cohen, 12.

[29] National Defense Panel, 23.

[30] Institute, 157.

[31] White House, 1-2.

[32] Cohen, 11.

[33] Walker and Reimer, 6.

[34] Tranette Ledford, "Employers Feeling Work Crunch," Army Times, September 14, 1998, p. 20.

[35] Dennis J. Reimer, One Team, One Fight, One Future (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998), 8-9.

[36] Aspin,

[37] Cohen, 32.

[38] Reimer, One Team, 14.

[39] Aspin, 30.

[40] Cohen, 32.

[41] United States General Accounting Office, Army National Guard: Combat Brigades' Ability to be Ready for War in 90 Days is Uncertain (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Accounting Office, June 1995), 3; the eSB concept had until FY99 to be fully implemented, so readiness has probably improved. Also, eSBs completing an NTC rotation will be more ready than other eSBs, and may be ready in less than 90-days. If so, these brigades may be available to deploy in time for a first MTW as an augmentation force.

[42] Cohen, 32.

[43] Institute, 146.

[44] Ibid., 147.

[45] Ibid., 148.

[46] Ibid., 146.

[47] Walker and Reimer, 14.

[48] Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, DoD 1215.15-H: The Reserve Components of the United States Armed Forces, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1998), 47.

[49] Center for Naval Analyses, USMC Active and Reserve Force Structure and Mix Study (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1992), 8-16; , "United States Marine Corps Reserve Strength," linked from Marine Forces Reserve at "About Marine Forces Reserve." Available from <http://www.marforres.usmc.mil/>; Internet; accessed 16 December 1998.; estimate of 20 percent is based on a total Marine Corps Reserve unit strength of 33,625 and 7,400 full-time support Marines (mix of active and active reserve).

[50] Center, 14-16.

[51] Office, 26.

[52] Based on the Marine Corps Reserve model of 20% full-time support in units, approximately 13,000 to 20,000 AC and RC full timers would be required to resource this concept. To assign AC officers and NCOs to RC units in sufficient quantity would require the AC to increase its numbers of officers and NCOs and decrease its numbers of soldiers. This shift would increase the demand on retention and decrease the requirement for recruits.

[53] This assumption is based on a minimum number equal to the five active divisions currently allocated to each MTW—half the ten active divisions—and a maximum of seven divisions as employed during DESERT STORM.

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